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Abstract	  
Despite	   the	   lure	   of	   Alpine	   landscapes,	   Frankenstein	   hasn’t	   been	   taken	   up	   at	  
length	   by	   many	   ecocritics.	   This	   article	   will	   examine	   monstrosity	   and	  
acculturation	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Western	   culture’s	   objectification	   of	   nonhuman	  
nature,	   circling	   back	   to	   bodies	   of	   water	   and	   the	   extraordinary	   environmental	  
conditions	   of	   the	   novel’s	   production.	   Alongside	   explicit	   references	   to	   and	  
representations	  of	  the	  natural	  world,	  human	  responses	  to	  nonhuman	  nature	  are	  
often	   negatively	   inscribed,	   inversely	   articulated	   or	   unconscious,	   in	   culture.	  
Reading	   dialectically	   foregrounds	   both	   types	   of	   inscription.	   A	   dialectical	  
ecocriticism,	   what	   I	   am	   calling	   ecocultural	   materialism	   or	   an	   ecocultural	  
approach,	   as	   a	   critical	   position	   and	   methodology,	   suggests	   that	   nonhuman	  
nature	  not	  only	  encompasses	  and	  impacts	  human	  cultures,	  in	  ways	  that	  we	  can	  
and	   cannot	   see,	   but	   that	   it	   also	   might	   serve	   as	   an	   intervention	   in	   human	  
cultures,	  in	  ways	  that	  we	  both	  can	  and	  cannot	  understand.	  	  	  
Introduction	  
Frankenstein	  moves	   like	  an	   iceberg	   in	  chill	  waters.	  Structurally,	   the	  narrative	   is	   surrounded	  by	  
the	   Arctic	   Ocean	   and,	   within	   each	   concentric	   narration,	   a	   body	   of	   water	   serves	   as	   the	  
background	   for	   the	   novel’s	   most	   dramatic	   action:	   Lake	   Leman,	   the	   North	   Sea,	   or	   the	   Arctic.	  	  
Frankenstein	   embeds	  human	  activity	   in,	   quite	   literally,	   a	   sea	  of	   connections.	   	   Bodies	   of	  water	  
seem	   present	   in	   opposition	   to	   other	   bodies:	  mountains,	   islands,	   and	   human	   beings	   or,	  more	  
accurately,	   humanity	   and	   its	   habitat,	   dry	   land.	   	   Here	   expanses	   of	   water	   function	   as	   sublime	  
landscapes	   in	  their	  own	  right,	  as	  unfathomable	   immensities	  or	   impenetrable	  depths.	   	  And,	   like	  
typically	  sublime	  topography,	  these	  large	  bodies	  of	  water	  have	  peaks	  and	  valleys,	  jagged	  edges	  
and	  roaring	  sounds;	  they	  are	  uncontrollable	  and	  overwhelming.	  	  	  
Despite	   the	   lure	   of	   such	   landscapes,	   Frankenstein	   hasn’t	   been	   taken	   up	   at	   length	   by	   many	  
ecocritics.	   	   Jonathan	  Bate’s	  brief	  analysis	   in	  The	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  Earth	   remains	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ecocritical	  commentaries	  on	  the	  novel.	  	  Ecocriticism,	  as	  a	  self-­‐conscious	  critical	  practice,	  gained	  
legitimacy	  quickly	  in	  Romantic	  studies	  because	  many	  of	  its	  critical	  concerns	  were	  already	  a	  part	  
of	   the	   field.	   	  Questions	  about	   the	   relationship	  between	  human	  beings	  and	   the	   rest	  of	  nature,	  
knowledge	   and	   power,	   and	   the	   various	   effects	   of	   the	   Industrial	   Revolution	   are	   central	   to	  
Romantic	   writing	   and	   scholars	   of	   Romanticism.	   	   Frankenstein,	   perhaps	   more	   than	   any	   other	  
Romantic	  text,	  explicitly	  asks	  such	  questions,	  challenging	  readers	  to	  engage	  layers	  of	  ambivalent	  
theorizing	  of	  dialectical	   relations	   (between	  characters,	   ideas,	   texts,	  and	   so	  on).	   	  As	   the	  critical	  
discourse	   on	   and	   around	   Frankenstein	   continues	   to	   reach	   staggering	   proportions	   (much	   of	   it	  
written	   in	   the	   last	   fifteen	   years),	   the	   novel’s	   ambivalence	   seems	   even	  more	   pronounced;	   the	  
critical	  body	  magnifies	  fissures	  in	  textual	  meaning,	  leaving	  a	  labyrinth	  of	  relations.	  	  	  	  	  
Though	  there	  is	  a	  shortage	  of	  ecocritical	  readings	  of	  Frankenstein,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  Marxist	  
analyses	  of	  the	  novel.	  	  A	  “standard”	  Marxist	  reading,	  if	  it	  examined	  the	  recurrence	  of	  bodies	  of	  
water,	   for	   example,	   would	   likely	   read	   the	   trope	   as	   part	   of	   a	   structured	   retreat	   from	   the	  
problems	   of	  modernity.	   	   Herein	   lies	   the	   need	   for	   an	   ecocritical	   reading	   of	   the	   novel:	  Marxist	  
readings,	  while	  absolutely	  indispensable,	  tend	  to	  view	  the	  representation	  of	  nature	  in	  the	  novel	  
as	  simply	  “part	  of	  the	  problem,”	  repressing	  the	  modern,1	  or	  as	  padding,	  filler	  from	  the	  Shelley’s	  
“tourist	  diary,”	  History	  of	  a	  Six	  Weeks’	  Tour.2	  	  Most	  do	  not	  see	  the	  way	  in	  which	  representations	  
of	  nature	  connect	  to	  the	  core	  contradictions	  of	  the	  novel	  (such	  as	   its	  representation	  or	   lack	  of	  
representation	   of	   class	   politics)	   and	   the	   way	   in	   which	   these	   representations	   are	   themselves	  
inherently	  political.3	  	  	  
There	   is,	   however,	   an	   important	   connection	   between	   these	   natural	   bodies	   of	   water	   and	   the	  
produced	   body	   of	   the	   monster.	   	   Victor’s	   drive	   to	   transcend	   human	   nature	   and	   culture,	   to	  
transcend	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  human	  body	  and	  human	  knowledge,	  is	  akin	  to	  Robert	  Walton’s	  
drive	   to	   transverse	   the	   Arctic	   Ocean.	   	   In	   both	   cases,	   materiality	   becomes	   an	   obstacle	   to	  
overcome,	  rather	  than	  the	  fabric	  of	  existence.	   	  The	  constant	  narrative	  proximity	  to	  and	  within	  
bodies	  of	  water,	  and	  its	  parallel	  in	  the	  body	  of	  the	  monster,	  serves	  to	  remind	  us	  of	  our	  bodies,	  
and	  the	  human	  place	  in	  the	  material	  weight	  of	  the	  world.	  	  It	  is	  far	  from	  a	  coincidence	  that	  Freud	  
terms	  the	  unbounded	  sense	  of	  connection	  to	  the	  universe	  the	  “oceanic	  feeling.”	  	  It	  is,	  in	  fact,	  a	  
manifestation	  of	  an	  immanent	  sensibility,	  of	  our	  sense	  of	  the	  interconnectedness	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
This	   sense	   is	   reified	   in	  Western,	   capitalist	   culture;	   our	   connection	   to	   the	   immanent	   world	   is	  
transformed	  into	  its	  opposite,	  into	  a	  drive	  for	  transcendence	  –	  a	  drive	  to	  transcend	  the	  world	  of	  
“objects”	  and	  the	  evidence	  of	  our	  belonging	  to	  it,	  the	  body.4	  	  	  
Expanses	   of	  water	   embody	   the	   immense	   and	   active	  more-­‐than-­‐human	  world	   surrounding	   the	  
plot	   of	   the	  novel	   and	   surfacing	   in	   the	   character	   of	   the	  monster,	   and	  monstrosity	   itself	   as	   the	  
subject	  of	  this	  critique.	  	  In	  this	  article	  as	  in	  the	  novel,	  bodies	  of	  water	  encompass	  an	  examination	  
of	   interconnected	   ideas	   and	   concerns,	   including	   origins	   and	   monstrosity,	   education	   and	  
intertextuality,	   culture	   and	   the	   Bildungsroman.	   	   From	   the	   incredible	   size	   and	   strength	   of	   the	  
monster,	   to	   the	   significance	   of	   his	   articulations	   and	   Victor’s	   irrational	   response	   to	   his	   gaze,	  
Frankenstein	  registers	  culture’s	  terror	  of	  nonhuman	  agency	  as,	  in	  part,	  a	  fear	  of	  objectification.	  	  
When	   the	  monster	   speaks,	   culture	   speaks	   both	   through	   and	   against	   him;	   the	   oceanic	   feeling	  
becomes	  the	  production	  of	  monstrosity.	  	  This	  article	  will	  examine	  monstrosity	  and	  acculturation	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  Western	  culture’s	  objectification	  of	  nonhuman	  nature,	  circling	  back	  to	  bodies	  
of	  water	  and	  the	  extraordinary	  environmental	  conditions	  of	  the	  novel’s	  production.	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Alongside	  explicit	  references	  to	  and	  representations	  of	  the	  natural	  world,	  human	  responses	  to	  
nonhuman	   nature	   are	   often	   negatively	   inscribed,	   inversely	   articulated	   or	   unconscious,	   in	  
culture.5	   	  Reading	  dialectically	  foregrounds	  both	  types	  of	  inscription.	  	  A	  dialectical	  ecocriticism,	  
what	   I	  am	  calling	  ecocultural	  materialism	  or	  an	  ecocultural	  approach,	  as	  a	  critical	  position	  and	  
methodology,	   suggests	   that	   nonhuman	   nature	   not	   only	   encompasses	   and	   impacts	   human	  
cultures,	  in	  ways	  that	  we	  can	  and	  cannot	  see,	  but	  that	  it	  also	  might	  serve	  as	  an	  intervention	  in	  
human	  cultures,	  in	  ways	  that	  we	  both	  can	  and	  cannot	  understand.	  	  
There	   is	   much	   negatively	   inscribed	   in	   Frankenstein,	   what	   the	   text	   means	   but	   does	   not	   say.	  	  
Conversely,	  the	  monstrous	  is	  that	  which	  speaks	  but	  isn’t	  allowed	  to	  “mean;”	  monstrosity	  itself	  is	  
constituted	  by	  meaningful	  acts	  of	  anything,	  anyone	  not	  human.	  	  The	  monster,	  the	  Other	  in	  (and	  
of)	  Western	  culture,	  both	  figures	  and	  displaces	  the	  existence	  of	  this	  worldly	  nonhuman	  agency,	  
relegating	  it	  to	  the	  shadows	  of	  the	  fantastic.	  	  While	  the	  monster	  signifies	  many	  things,	  including	  
the	  unsignifiable	  itself,	  he	  is	  also	  an	  imprint	  of	  a	  human	  fear	  of	  nonhuman	  agency.	  
There	  has	  been	  some	  critical	  dispute	  about	  what	  to	  call	  the	  monster.	  	  In	  The	  Song	  of	  the	  Earth,	  
Jonathan	   Bate	   refers	   to	   this	   character,	   the	   third	   narrator,	   as	   “Creature”	   (and	   only	   creature)	  
instead	  of	  “monster”	  or	  any	  of	  the	  other	  names	  for	  him	  which	  appear	  in	  the	  text.	  	  To	  refer	  to	  the	  
monster	  as	  “Creature”	  alone	  flattens	  the	  complexity	  of	  both	  the	  character	  and	  the	  philosophical	  
problems	  he	  embodies.	   	  As	  Warren	  Montag	  suggests,	  “the	  monster	   is	  a	  product	   rather	   than	  a	  
creation,	  assembled	  and	  joined	  together	  not	  so	  much	  by	  a	  man	  …as	  by	  science,	  technology,	  and	  
industry	  …whose	  overarching	  logic	  subsumes	  and	  subjects	  even	  the	  greatest	  of	  geniuses”	  (388).	  	  
In	  an	  attempt	  to	  respect	  the	  monster’s	  agency	  (or	  perhaps	  to	  give	  him	  more	  agency),	  Bate	  calls	  
him	   Creature;	   oddly,	   however,	   it	   has	   the	   reverse	   effect,	   ignoring	   the	   radical	   potential	   of	   the	  
monster	   and	   text.	   	   As	  Michie	   demonstrates,	   the	   novel	   consistently	   and	   symbolically	   replaces	  
narratives	  of	  creation	  with	  narratives	  of	  production,	  even	   intertextually,	  as	   in	  the	  replacement	  
of	  Paradise	  Lost	  with	  Victor’s	  laboratory	  journal	  (97).	  	  These	  movements	  between	  creation	  and	  
production	  enacted	  by	  the	  multiple	  “names”	  culture	  uses	  to	  classify	  the	  monster	  bears	  upon	  the	  
explicitly	  dialectical	  relationship	  in	  the	  text,	  that	  of	  master	  and	  slave.	  Effacing	  the	  dictates	  of	  the	  
former	   (the	  master’s	   classifications)	   erases	   the	   latter,	   removing	   the	   revolutionary	  potential	   of	  
the	  slave	  and	  of	  monstrosity	  generally.	  	  
As	   the	   Bildungsroman	   of	   Frankenstein’s	   monster	   (and	   of	   Frankenstein	   himself)	   the	   novel	  
suggests	  something	  about	  our	  relationship	  to	  our	  own	  biological	  origins	  and	  the	  origin	  of	  culture	  
itself	   as	   a	   response	   to	  nonhuman	  nature.	   	   The	  monster’s	   narrative,	   embedded	  within	  Victor’s	  
story	  told	  to	  Robert,	  details	  his	  birth	  to	  sensation,	  thought,	  and	  reason.	  	  As	  he	  watches	  the	  De	  
Lacey	  family	  in	  their	  cottage	  from	  the	  hole	  in	  the	  wall	  of	  his	  adjacent	  refuge,	  the	  monster	  learns	  
about	  human	  beings	  and	  human	  culture	  through	  observation	  and	  second-­‐hand	  lessons,	  such	  as	  
Felix’s	   tutelage	   of	   Safie.	   	   In	   a	   remarkably	   short	   period	   of	   time,	   the	   monster	   leaps	   from	   the	  
realization	  that	  the	  sounds	  he	  hears	  have	  meanings	  to	  the	  association	  of	  words	  with	  objects:	  
I	   found	  that	  these	  people	  possessed	  a	  method	  of	  communicating	  their	  experience	  and	  
feelings	  to	  one	  another	  by	  articulate	  sounds.	  	  …This	  was	  indeed	  a	  godlike	  science,	  and	  I	  
ardently	   desired	   to	   become	   acquainted	  with	   it.	   	   But	   I	   was	   baffled	   in	   every	   attempt	   I	  
made	   for	   this	   purpose.	   	   …By	   great	   application,	   however,	   and	   after	   having	   remained	  
during	  the	  space	  of	  several	  revolutions	  of	  the	  moon	  in	  my	  hovel,	  I	  discovered	  the	  names	  
that	  were	  given	  to	  some	  of	  the	  most	  familiar	  objects	  of	  discourse:	  I	  learned	  and	  applied	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the	   words	   fire,	   milk,	   bread,	   and	   wood.	   	   I	   also	   learned	   the	   names	   of	   the	   cottagers	  
themselves.	  (88-­‐89)	  	  	  	  	  
Within	   another	   few	  months,	   the	  monster	   has	   already	   grasped	   the	   highly	   abstract	   concept	   of	  
signs,	  the	  process	  of	  reading	  and	  writing:	  	  	  
This	  reading	  had	  puzzled	  me	  at	  first;	  but,	  by	  degrees,	  I	  discovered	  that	  he	  [Felix]	  
uttered	   many	   of	   the	   same	   sounds	   when	   he	   read	   as	   when	   he	   talked.	   	   I	  
conjectured,	   therefore,	   that	  he	   found	   signs	  on	   the	  paper	   for	   speech	  which	  he	  
understood,	  and	  I	  ardently	  longed	  to	  comprehend	  these	  also;	  but	  how	  was	  that	  
possible,	  when	   I	   did	   not	   even	  understand	   the	   sounds	   for	  which	   they	   stood	   as	  
signs?	  (90)	  
The	  monster’s	  narrative	  of	  his	  development	  does	  not	  make	  any	  attempt	  to	  answer	  this	  question;	  
he	  does	  not	  know	  how	  it	  was	  possible	  for	  him	  to	  grasp	  such	  concepts	  so	  quickly	  and	  before	  he	  
was	   able	   to	   grasp	   the	   complexities	   of	   language	   itself.	   	   His	   next	   sentence	   is:	   “I	   improved,	  
however,	  sensibly	   in	  this	  science,	  but	  not	  sufficiently	  to	  follow	  up	  any	  kind	  of	  conversation	  …”	  
(90).	  	  	  
The	  monster	   then	  masters	   language	   itself	   within	   a	  matter	   of	   a	   few	  more	  months.	   	   As	   Nancy	  
Yousef	   notes	   in	   “The	  Monster	   in	   a	   Dark	   Room:	   Frankenstein,	   Feminism,	   and	   Philosophy,”	   his	  
development	  is	   in	  most	  respects	  no	  less	  fantastic	  than	  his	  non-­‐birth	  (198).	   	  Yousef	  situates	  the	  
impossibility	   of	   the	   monster’s	   development	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   sustained,	   multi-­‐generational	  
feminist	  engagement	  with	  empiricist	  thinkers	  such	  as	  Locke	  and	  Rousseau;	  the	  monster’s	  radical	  
autonomy	   from	   the	  dependency	  of	   infancy	   and	   the	  normal	   childhood	  network	  of	   relationship	  
(which,	   she	   argues,	   serves	   to	   critique	   and	   enlarge	   the	   tradition	   of	   empiricism)	   makes	   him	  
monstrous	  (220-­‐226).	  	  	  
To	   examine	   the	   monster’s	   radical	   autonomy	   (and	   radical	   potential),	   we	   must	   return	   to	   his	  
acquisition	   of	   language.	   	   The	  monster’s	   speech,	   his	   narration	   to	   Victor	   (reported	   by	   Victor	   to	  
Robert,	  narrated	  by	  Robert	   in	  a	   letter	   to	  his	   sister	  Margaret	   [Walton]	  Saville),	   is	   the	  structural	  
center	   of	   the	   novel,	   and	   his	   acquisition	   of	   language	   perhaps	   the	  most	   improbable	   part	   of	   his	  
impossible	  existence.	   	  His	  voice	   is	   the	  voice	  of	  question,	   the	  voice	  of	   the	  child	  discovering	   the	  
world	  and	   its	  misery	  as	  his	  own.	   	  Upon	   learning	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  human	  social	  world	  from	  
Felix’s	   recitations	   to	   Safie	   from	  Volney’s	  Ruins	   of	   Empires,	   the	  monster	   begins	   to	   examine	  his	  
own	  nature:	  
The	  words	   induced	  me	  to	  turn	  towards	  myself.	   	   I	   learned	  that	   the	  possessions	  
most	   esteemed	   by	   your	   fellow-­‐creatures	   were,	   high	   and	   unsullied	   descent	  
united	   with	   riches.	   	   A	   man	   might	   be	   respected	   with	   only	   one	   of	   these	  
acquisitions;	   but	   without	   either	   he	   was	   considered,	   except	   in	   very	   rare	  
instances,	  as	  a	  vagabond	  and	  a	  slave,	  doomed	  to	  waste	  his	  powers	  for	  the	  profit	  
of	   the	   chosen	   few.	   	   And	   what	   was	   I?	   	   Of	   my	   creation	   and	   creator	   I	   was	  
absolutely	   ignorant;	  but	  I	  knew	  that	  I	  possessed	  no	  money,	  no	  friends,	  no	  kind	  
of	   property.	   	   I	   was,	   besides,	   endowed	   with	   a	   figure	   hideously	   deformed	   and	  
loathsome;	  I	  was	  not	  even	  the	  same	  nature	  as	  man.	   	  …When	  I	   looked	  around	  I	  
saw	  and	  heard	  of	  none	   like	  me.	   	  Was	   I	   then	  a	  monster,	  a	  blot	  upon	  the	  earth,	  
from	  which	  all	  men	  fled,	  and	  whom	  all	  men	  disowned?	  (96,	  emphasis	  mine)	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Moments	   later,	   the	  monster	   self-­‐consciously	   repeats	  his	  question,	   “What	  was	   I?	   The	  question	  
again	  recurred,	  to	  be	  answered	  only	  with	  groans”	  (97,	  emphasis	  mine).	  	  Even	  before	  he	  learns	  of	  
his	  fantastic	  creation	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  Victor,	  the	  monster	  is	  convinced	  that	  he	  is	  wholly	  different	  
from	   human	   beings,	   “a	   blot	   upon	   the	   earth.”	   	   Only	   after	   he	   learns	   of	   the	   hierarchical	  
organization	   of	  Western	   culture	   does	   he	   ask,	   “What	   was	   I?”	   	   Grammatically,	   it	   positions	   the	  
monster	   as	   an	   object,	   making	   him	   oddly	   nonexistent	   (or	   nonperson)	   in	   the	   moment	   of	   the	  
question’s	  asking.	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  monster	   asks	  his	   terrified	  question,	  which	   seems	   to	  position	  him	   to	  himself	   as	   a	  monster	  
(conflating	  nonhuman,	  nonperson,	  and	  object),	  not	  when	  he	  discovered	   the	  horror	  of	  how	  he	  
was	  made	  in	  Victor’s	   laboratory,	  but	  when	  he	  discovers	  from	  what	  and	   into	  what	  he	  has	  been	  
made:	   the	  past	  and	  present	  of	  Western	  culture.	   	  Read	  positively,	   the	  horror	   that	   the	  monster	  
expresses	   is	   a	   horror	   of	   culture;	   Western	   culture,	   and	   not	   the	   monster,	   is	   in	   fact	   the	  
subject/object	  of	  the	  monster’s	  query.	  	  Read	  negatively,	  this	  question	  becomes	  the	  sound	  of	  the	  
subject,	   of	  Western	   culture	   itself	   in	   the	   figure	   of	   the	  monster,	   asking	  monstrosity,	   “What	   are	  
you?”	  	  Displaced	  grammatically	  as	  object,	  as	  the	  referent	  of	  “what”	  rather	  than	  who,	  the	  voice	  
of	  Western	   culture	   asks,	   through	   its	   own	   subject/product,	   the	   nature	   of	   its	   “opposite.”	   	   The	  
monster	  is,	  in	  this	  sense,	  the	  ultimate	  Other,	  that	  which	  literally	  figures	  Western	  culture’s	  horror	  
of	  nonhuman	  agency.	  	  While	  the	  content	  of	  the	  question	  seems	  designed	  to	  deny	  the	  agency	  of	  
the	   nonhuman,	   as	   a	   question	   it	   formally	   acknowledges	   the	   agency	   (the	   subjectivity)	   of	  
nonhuman	   others.	   	   It	   is	   a	   question	   to	  which	  Western	   and	   possibly	   all	   of	   human	   culture	   both	  
fears	  and	  expects	  a	   reply.	   	   It	   is	   the	  question	  of	   the	   little	  boy	  who	  asks	  quietly,	   in	   the	  dark,	  “Is	  
there	  anyone	  under	  my	  bed?”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Language,	   defined	   as	   a	   system	   of	   communication	   that	   signifies	   abstract	   concepts	   as	   well	   as	  
concrete	  referents,	  is	  supposedly	  that	  which	  separates	  human	  beings	  from	  other	  creatures	  and,	  
correspondingly,	  culture	  from	  nature.	  	  Language	  represents	  the	  difference	  between	  human	  and	  
nonhuman	   as	   the	   difference	   between	   agency	   and	   nonagency.	   	   In	   “Teaching	   the	   Monster	   to	  
Read:	   Mary	   Shelley,	   Education	   and	   Frankenstein,”	   Anne	   McWhir	   notes	   that	   the	   Eighteenth	  
Century	  contained	  many	  beings	  whose	  status	  as	  human	  was	  controversial,	   including	  wild	  men,	  
idiots,	   women,	   non-­‐Western	   peoples,	   and	   orangutans:	   “According	   to	   James	   Burnet,	   Lord	  
Monboddo	   (1.187-­‐88),	   [orangutans]	  were	   in	   fact	  members	  of	   the	  human	   species.	   	  Monboddo	  
argues	   this	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   educability	   and	   their	   presumed	   capacity	   for	   speech”	   (80).6	  	  
Western	  culture’s	  narrowly	  defined	  notion	  of	  language	  serves	  as	  the	  benchmark	  for	  subjectivity	  
ordinarily	   to	   exclude,	   rather	   include,	   other	   living	   beings	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   meaningful	  
consciousness	   and	   therefore	   agency	   and	   rights.	   	   Certainly	   the	   monster’s	   very	   narrative	  
challenges	  the	  notion	  that	  language,	  and	  therefore	  culture,	  is	  the	  sole	  territory	  of	  human	  beings;	  
he	  and	  others	  repeatedly	  emphasize	  both	  his	  difference	  from	  human	  beings	  and	  his	  remarkable	  
powers	   of	   articulate	   reasoning.	   	   To	   share	   our	   identity	   as	   culture-­‐makers	   with	   other	   beings	  
means,	  terrifyingly,	  that	  we	  share	  their	  status	  as	  part	  of	  and	  subject	  to	  nature,	  “red	  in	  tooth	  and	  
claw”	  or	  otherwise.	   	  The	  degree	  to	  which	  Mary	  Shelley’s	  depiction	  of	  the	  monster’s	  process	  of	  
acquiring	   language	   –	   Rousseau’s	   “supplement”	   to	   nature	   –	   seems	   fantastic	   is	   the	   degree	   to	  
which	  we	  fear	  nonhuman	  agency.	  	  	  
Explicitly,	   the	   monster’s	   ability	   to	   narrate	   makes	   him	   monstrous,	   makes	   him	   unnatural.	  	  
“Negatively,”	  his	  narrative	  of	  coming	  into	  Western	  culture	  expresses	  culture’s	  anxiety	  about	  its	  
self-­‐proclaimed	  identity	  as	  unique	  in	  the	  world.	  	  A	  little	  nervously,	  culture	  exclaims,	  “I	  am	  alone;	  
everywhere	  I	  turn	  I	  see	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  else	  like	  me	  in	  the	  entire	  world.”	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	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monster	   functions	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   our	   fear	   of	   nonhuman	   agency,	   whispering	   against	   our	  
insistence	  that	  we	  are	  alone	  in	  the	  world.	  	  And	  yet,	  the	  monster’s	  lack	  of	  “natural”	  connections,	  
his	   manufactured	   alienation,	   negatively	   betrays	   our	   recognition,	   and	   fear,	   of	   similarity.	   	   The	  
novel	   repeatedly	   compares	   the	   monster	   to	   other	   characters,	   encouraging	   readers	   to	   do	   the	  
same,	  to	  recognize	  similar	  needs,	  desires,	  and	  fears.	   	  As	  nearly	  all	  critics	  of	  the	  novel	  note,	  the	  
monster	  is,	  in	  several	  respects,	  Victor’s	  double.	  	  	  
This	   representation	  of	  duality	   suggests	  a	   conscious	  critique	  of	   capitalism	  as	  well	   as	  an	  anxiety	  
about	  identity	  within	  capitalism.	  	  Margo	  Perkins’s	  Hegelian	  reading	  of	  the	  novel,	  “The	  Nature	  of	  
Otherness:	  Class	  and	  Difference	  in	  Mary	  Shelley’s	  Frankenstein,”	  focuses	  on	  the	  Master-­‐Servant	  
dialectic	   between	   Victor	   and	   the	   monster	   and	   its	   relation	   to	   class	   politics,	   especially	   in	   the	  
representations	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  class	  and	   justice,	  and	  material	  reality	  and	  ethical	  
values	   (27).	   	  Perkins	  notes	   that	  Victor	   imposes	   the	  moral	  values	  of	  his	   class	  onto	   the	  monster	  
and	  that,	  according	  to	  those	  values,	  characters’	  responses	  to	  the	  monster	  are	  predetermined;	  as	  
we	   see	  with	   little	  William	   Frankenstein,	   there	   can	   be	   no	   innocence	  within	   capitalism	   (39-­‐40).	  	  
Perkins	   argues	   that	   although	   Shelley	   raises	   issues	   about	   class	   oppression,	   she	   doesn’t	   really	  
challenge	   existing	   class	   structure	   (40).	   	   Indeed,	   as	   a	   representation	   of	   class	   relations,	   the	  
dialectic	  between	  Victor	  and	  the	  monster	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  positive	  
change,	  for	  an	  intervention	  in	  the	  spiraling	  crisis	  of	  capitalism.	  	  From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  novel	  
seems	   to	   reify	   bourgeois	   anxiety	   about	   class	   oppression,	   making	   it	   another	   regrettable	   yet	  
insurmountable	  “natural”	  crisis,	  like	  a	  storm	  above	  Mont	  Blanc	  or	  turbulence	  on	  Lake	  Leman.	  	  It	  
becomes,	  as	  a	  product	  of	  a	  Victor’s	   “natural”	   curiosity	  and	  human	   failings,	  part	  of	   the	  cost	  of	  
living.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
However,	  as	  a	  double	  (and	  to	  some	  degree	  parallel)	  Bildungsroman,	  Frankenstein	  expresses	  this	  
anxiety	   in	   more	   fluid	   terms.	   	   Victor’s	   narrative	   of	   coming	   into	   culture	   begins	   with	   the	   social	  
context	  of	  his	  birth,	   the	  social	  standing	  of	  his	   family	   in	  Geneva,	  and	  the	  history	  of	  his	  parents’	  
meeting	  and	  marriage.	   	  The	   first	  mention	  of	  Victor’s	  person	   is	   in	   the	  context	  of	  his	  education:	  
“[My	  father]	   relinquished	  many	  of	  his	  public	  employments,	  and	  devoted	  himself	  exclusively	   to	  
the	  education	  of	  his	   children.	   	  Of	   these	   I	  was	   the	  eldest,	  and	   the	  destined	  successor	   to	  all	  his	  
labors	   and	   utility.	   	   No	   creature	   could	   have	  more	   tender	   parents	   than	  mine”	   (19).	   	   From	   this	  
beginning,	  Victor	  goes	  on	  to	  describe	  the	  introduction	  of	  his	  cousin	  Elizabeth	  into	  his	  family,	  his	  
close	  friend	  Henry	  Clerval,	  his	  interest	  in	  natural	  philosophy,	  and	  the	  violent	  thunderstorm	  that	  
inspired	  his	   later	  experiments.	   	  At	  seventeen,	  “I	  became	  the	   instructor	  of	  my	  brothers.	   	  Ernest	  
was	  six	  years	  younger	  than	  myself,	  and	  was	  my	  principal	  pupil”	  (25).	  	  	  
Victor’s	  acculturation	  is,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  his	  father’s	  rebuff	  concerning	  Cornelius	  Agrippa,	  a	  
happy	  discovery	  of	   the	  world,	   as	   student	   and	   teacher.	   	   It	   is	   significant	   that	   Ernest	   (again,	   the	  
only	   member	   of	   the	   Frankenstein	   family	   to	   survive	   the	   events	   of	   the	   narrative)	   is	   Victor’s	  
primary	  pupil,	  a	  point	  I	  will	  return	  to	  in	  a	  moment.	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  monster’s	  narrative	  begins	  
with	  pain	   and	  uncertainty	   about	   the	  world	   and	  his	  place	   in	   it.	   	  We	  are	   struck	  by	   the	   contrast	  
between	   one	   creature’s	   fond	   description	   of	   his	   tender	   parents	   and	   the	   other’s	   sense	   of	   his	  
parent’s	  horror	  at	  the	  fact	  of	  his	  existence.	  	  	  	  	  	  
As	  a	  pedagogical	   tool,	   the	  Bildungsroman	  often	   serves	  as	  either	   cautionary	  or	  exemplary	   tale.	  	  
That	   both	   Victor’s	   and	   the	  monster’s	   narratives	   revolve	   around	   education	   seems	   particularly	  
important.	   	   Victor	   is	   not	   only	   Ernest’s	   instructor,	   he	   is	   also	   the	   monster’s.	   	   Through	   Victor’s	  
journal,	   the	   monster	   learns	   not	   only	   the	   facts	   of	   his	   birth	   but	   also	   the	   social	   context	   of	   his	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production.	   	   While	   Victor	   begins	   his	   narrative	   with	   the	   knowledge	   of	   his	   birth	   (natural	   and	  
social),	  the	  monster	  must	  discover	  this	  information	  through	  writing.	  	  As	  Paul	  Cantor	  and	  others	  
argue,	  the	  monster’s	  acculturation	  only	  furthers	  his	  alienation	  (126),	  while	  human	  solidarity	  with	  
Victor	  persists	  throughout	  the	  novel	  (Yousef	  223).	  	  In	  fact,	  Anne	  McWhir	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  argue	  
that	   the	  monster	   is	   an	  uncritical	   reader	  whose	  encounters	  with	  Paradise	   Lost	   and	  other	   texts	  
cause	  only	  suffering.	  	  
The	   role	   of	   production	   in	   acculturation	   is	   expressed	   in	   the	   intertexuality	   of	   these	   parallel	  
Bildungsromans.	   	  While	  the	  positive	  representation	  of	  this	  produced	  nature	  of	  culture	  betrays,	  
as	   indicated	   earlier,	   an	   anxiety	   about	   identity	   within	   capitalism,	   the	   “negative”	   of	   this	  
representation	   reveals	   capitalist	   culture’s	   own	   anxiety	   about	   its	   nature.	   	   While	   the	  
Bildungsromans	  seem	  as	  different	  as	  two	  accounts	  of	  growing	  into	  the	  world	  could	  possibly	  be,	  
they	  both	  clearly	  represent	  acculturation	  as	  a	  process	  of	  production,	  a	  process	  interpersonal	  and	  
intertextual.	   	   The	  monster’s	   narrative	   is	   embedded	  within	  Victor’s,	  which	   is	   embedded	  within	  
Walton’s	  letters	  to	  his	  sister	  (breaking	  the	  traditionally	  male	  cycle	  of	  the	  genre	  as	  a	  story	  of	  male	  
acculturation	   to	   be	   read	   by	   young	  men	   in	   the	   process	   of	   their	   acculturation).7	   	   Through	   the	  
embedded	   external	   narrative	   of	   Paradise	   Lost,	   the	   novel	   alternately	   casts	   Victor	   as	   God-­‐like,	  
Adamic,	   and	  Satanic,	   and	   the	  monster	  as	  Adamic	  and	  Satanic,	   and	  each	  character	  periodically	  
refers	   to	   himself	   in	   such	   terms.8	   	   This	   revelation	   of	   the	   instability	   of	   produced	   identity,	   even	  
between	   the	   extremes	   of	   creation	   itself,	   is	   the	   negative	   imprint	   of	   culture’s	   anxiety	   about	   its	  
own	  identity,	   its	  relation	  to	  nature	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  nature	  itself.	   	  Culture	  is	  produced,	  as	  the	  
novel	  insists	  through	  its	  layers	  of	  intertextual	  Bildungsromans,	  and	  Victor	  and	  the	  monster	  are,	  
in	  turn,	  products	  of	  acculturation	  and	  reproducers	  of	  culture.	  	  Negatively,	  this	  pattern	  reveals	  a	  
troubling	  question,	  the	  same	  question	  imprinted	  in	  the	  monster’s	  articulation,	  “What	  was	  I?”:	  if	  
nonhuman	  nature	  is	  as	  much	  “produced”	  as	  human	  nature,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  monster,	  then	  
what	  is	  human	  culture	  but	  one	  of	  the	  many	  cultures	  in	  nature?	  	  
As	  a	  pedagogical	  tool,	  one	  may	  wonder	  what	  this	  double	  Bildungsroman	  teaches	  and	  to	  whom.	  	  
Ernest,	   as	   the	   only	   surviving	  member	   of	   the	   immediate	   Frankenstein	   family,	   is	   in	   some	   sense	  
heir	   to	   this	   knowledge,	   though	   it	   is	   quite	   literally	   addressed	   to	   someone	   else.	   	   Perhaps,	   as	  
Elizabeth	  had	  hoped,	  he	  broke	  with	  his	  father’s	  wishes	  and,	  presumably,	  Victor’s	  teachings,	  and	  
became	  a	  farmer.	   	  While	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  Walton	  benefits	  from	  the	  lesson	  of	  Victor’s	  
experience,	  there	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  Ernest,	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  different	  relationship	  between	  
nature	   and	   culture,	   a	   different	   outcome	   of	   acculturation.	   	   As	   it	   stands,	   the	   processes	   of	  
acculturation	   represented	   in	   the	   novel,	   the	   interconnected	   Bildungsromans,	   reflect	   the	  
monster’s	  horrified	  articulation,	  “What	  was	  I?”:	  human	  culture’s	  fear	  of	  nonhuman	  agency	  and	  
the	  objectification	  of	  humanity.	  	  	  	  	  
This	   fear,	   imprinted	   in	   the	  monster’s	   narrative	   of	   his	   acquisition	   of	   language,	   is	   equally,	   and	  
perhaps	  most	  clearly,	  present	  in	  Victor’s	  initial	  reaction	  to	  the	  monster’s	  gaze.	  	  	  
[B]y	  the	  glimmer	  of	  the	  half-­‐extinguished	  light,	  I	  saw	  the	  dull	  yellow	  eye	  of	  the	  
creature	  open;	  it	  breathed	  hard,	  and	  a	  convulsive	  motion	  agitated	  its	  limbs.	  	  	  
How	   can	   I	   describe	   my	   emotions	   at	   this	   catastrophe,	   or	   how	   delineate	   the	  
wretch	  whom	  with	  such	  infinite	  pains	  and	  care	  I	  had	  endeavored	  to	  form?	  	  His	  
limbs	  were	  in	  proportion,	  and	  I	  had	  selected	  his	  features	  as	  beautiful.	  	  Beautiful!	  
–Great	  God!	  	  His	  yellow	  skin	  scarcely	  covered	  the	  work	  of	  muscles	  and	  arteries	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beneath;	   his	   hair	   was	   of	   a	   lustrous	   black,	   and	   flowing;	   his	   teeth	   of	   a	   pearly	  
whiteness;	   but	   these	   luxuriances	   only	   formed	   a	  more	   horrid	   contrast	  with	   his	  
watery	  eyes,	  that	  seemed	  almost	  of	  the	  same	  color	  as	  the	  dun	  white	  sockets	  in	  
which	  they	  were	  set,	  his	  shriveled	  complexion,	  and	  straight	  black	  lips.	  	  …Unable	  
to	  endure	  the	  aspect	  of	  the	  being	  I	  had	  created,	  I	  rushed	  out	  of	  the	  room,	  and	  
continued	  a	  long	  time	  traversing	  my	  bedchamber,	  unable	  to	  compose	  my	  mind	  
to	  sleep.	  (38-­‐9)	  	  
Victor’s	  shock	  at	  the	  sight	  of	  the	  monster’s	  eyes	  is	  truly	  shock	  at	  the	  sight	  of	  the	  monster	  looking	  
at	  him.	   	   It	   is	  not	  the	  aspect	  of	  his	  eyes,	   their	  color	  or	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  monster’s	  visage	  
(which,	  presumably,	  Victor	  was	  already	  quite	   aware	  of)	  but	   their	   aspect	   imbued	  with	   life,	   the	  
monster’s	   gaze,	   that	   causes	  Victor	   to	   flee	   in	   “breathless	  horror	  and	  disgust”	   (39).	   	  Negatively,	  
this	  fear	  is	  the	  fear	  of	  objectification,	  the	  fear	  of	  being	  on	  the	  other	  end	  of	  subjectivity.	  	  To	  the	  
mind	  of	  Western	   culture,	   the	  very	   fact	  of	   the	  nonhuman	  other’s	   subjectivity,	   embodied	   in	  his	  
gaze,	  threatens	  to	  do	  what	  human	  subjectivity	  often	  does:	  objectify	  and	  dominate.	  	  	  	  	  
Victor	  fears	  being	  produced	  as	  an	  object	  in	  his	  object’s	  gaze;	  in	  rationalist	  culture,	  the	  spectator	  
is	  always	  superior	  to	  the	  spectacle,	  the	  subject	  to	  all	  he	  senses.	  	  Negatively,	  this	  is	  the	  nightmare	  
knowledge	  of	  Western	  consciousness,	  its	  life	  as	  the	  passive,	  helpless	  object	  of	  nature’s	  agency.	  	  
Just	   as	   it	   has	  made	   nonhuman	   nature	  monstrous,	   it	   fears	   being	  made	  monstrous.	   	   Sight,	   like	  
language,	   represents	   subjectivity	   and	  agency	  …which	   really	  boils	  down	   to	  power.	   	  Here	   vision	  
serves	  as	  a	  mark	  of	  consciousness,	  and	  so	  nonhuman	  nature’s	  vision	  of	  humanity	  (the	  monster’s	  
gaze	   at	   Victor)	   threatens	   this	   construction	   of	   human	   agency.	   	  Western	   culture	   goes	   to	   great	  
lengths	   to	   insist	   that	   nonhuman	   animals	   look	   but	   do	   not	   see,	  make	   sound	   but	   do	   not	   speak.	  	  
Victor’s	   fear	  of	  the	  monster’s	  gaze	   is	  the	  negative	   imprint	  of	  culture’s	   fear	  of	  objectification,	  a	  
fear	   imprinted	   as	   early	   as	   the	   narrative	   of	   Jehovah’s	   insistence	   that	  Moses	   look	   not	   upon	  his	  
face	  for	  fear	  of	  death.	  	  Here	  too	  power	  does	  not	  want	  to	  be	  seen,	  to	  be	  objectified	  in	  the	  gaze	  of	  
another.	  
What	   is	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   story	  of	   culture’s	   reproduction,	   the	  Bildungsroman,	  and	  
culture’s	   fear	   of	   objectification,	   of	   oppression?	   	   The	   labyrinthine	   origins	   of	   culture,	   its	  
production	   and	   reproduction,	   lead	   back	   to	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   the	   oceanic	   feeling	   and	   the	  
discourse	  of	  monstrosity.	  	  The	  Bildungsroman,	  or	  story	  of	  coming	  into	  culture,	  is	  also	  the	  story	  of	  
culture	   coming	   into	   us;	   its	   production	   is	   its	   reproduction	   ad	   infinitum.	   	   In	   this	   way,	   culture	  
constructs	   itself	   as	   a	   “second	   nature,”	   displacing	   nonhuman	   nature	   to	   the	   shadowy	   status	   of	  
origin.	  	  It	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  narratives	  of	  coming	  into	  culture	  always	  begin	  inside	  culture;	  for	  
culture,	  there	  is	  no	  arrival	  from	  without,	  only	  the	  realization	  that	  we	  are	  always	  already	  inside	  
this	   second	  nature.	   	   From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	   the	  Bildungsroman	  appears	  as	  an	   insistence	   that	  
there	   isn’t	   anything	   out	   there;	   no	   there	   there,	   only	   the	   here	   of	   culture.	   	   In	   this	   context,	   the	  
oceanic	  feeling	  reminds	  us	  that	  something,	  even	  someone,	  is	  out	  there.	   	  The	  oceanic	  feeling	  is	  
another	  narrative	  of	  origins,	  one	  which	   insists	  on	  an	  elemental	  world	  encompassing	   the	  social	  
world	   of	   culture	   (culture,	   in	   this	   context,	   as	   a	  mechanism	   to	   defend	   against	   an	   unpredictable	  
and	  uncontrollable	  nature).	  	  Yet,	  in	  the	  world	  of	  second	  nature,	  this	  feeling	  is	  displaced	  into	  the	  
overlapping	  categories	  of	  the	  sublime	  and	  the	  monstrous,	  the	  transcendent	  and	  the	  unnatural.	  
In	  Frankenstein,	  mountains	  and	  bodies	  of	  water	  appear	  by	  turns	   inspiring	  or	   threatening.	   	  The	  
monster’s	   relationship	   to	   the	  Alps	  characterizes	   them	  as	  monstrous,	  unnaturally	   large,	   jagged,	  
and	   overwhelming,	  whereas	   Victor’s	   experience	   of	   the	  mountains,	   before	   his	   encounter	  with	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the	  monster,	   characterizes	   them	  as	   the	   repository	   of	   an	   awesome	   transcendence.	   	   There	   is	   a	  
similar	  dynamic	  with	  the	  many	  bodies	  of	  water	  in	  the	  novel,	  from	  Lake	  Leman	  to	  the	  North	  Sea	  
and	  the	  Arctic	  Ocean.	  	  However,	   in	  the	  case	  of	  water,	   it	   is	  Walton,	  and	  not	  Victor,	  who	  frames	  
the	   reader’s	  experience,	  painting	   the	  Arctic	  Ocean	  as	   sublime.	   	  Here	  Robert	  describes	  Victor’s	  
reaction	   to	   the	  Arctic	   landscape:	   “Even	  broken	   spirited	  as	  he	   is,	   no	  one	   can	   feel	  more	  deeply	  
than	  he	  does	  the	  beauties	  of	  nature.	  	  The	  starry	  sky,	  the	  sea,	  and	  every	  sight	  afforded	  by	  these	  
wonderful	  regions,	  seems	  still	  to	  have	  the	  power	  of	  elevating	  his	  soul	  from	  earth”	  (16).	  	  Though	  
perhaps	  more	   of	   a	   description	   of	   Robert	   himself	   than	   his	  mysterious	   passenger,	   contrast	   the	  
above	  passage	  with	  Victor’s	  experience	  of	  the	  Orkneys	  and	  the	  North	  Sea:	  	  
It	   was	   a	   place	   fitted	   for	   such	  work,	   being	   hardly	  more	   than	   a	   rock,	  whose	   high	   sides	  
were	  continually	  beaten	  upon	  by	   the	  waves.	   	  …when	  the	  weather	  permitted,	   I	  walked	  
on	  the	  stony	  beach	  of	  the	  sea,	  to	  listen	  to	  the	  waves	  as	  they	  roared,	  and	  dashed	  at	  my	  
feet.	  	  It	  was	  a	  monotonous,	  yet	  ever-­‐changing	  scene.	  	  I	  thought	  of	  Switzerland;	  it	  was	  far	  
different	   from	  this	  desolate	  and	  appalling	   landscape.	   	  …Its	   fair	   lakes	  reflect	  a	  blue	  and	  
gentle	   sky;	   and,	   when	   troubled	   by	   the	   winds,	   their	   tumult	   is	   but	   the	   play	   of	   a	   lively	  
infant,	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  roarings	  of	  the	  giant	  ocean.	  (136-­‐7)	  
Later,	  after	  Victor’s	  destruction	  of	  the	  half-­‐formed	  female	  creature,	  he	  revisits	  the	  same	  beach,	  
which	  he	  “almost	  regarded	  as	  an	  insuperable	  barrier	  between	  me	  and	  my	  fellow	  creatures;	  nay,	  
a	  wish	  that	  such	  should	  prove	  the	  fact	  stole	  across	  me”	  (141).	  	  The	  size	  and	  sound	  of	  the	  ocean,	  
compared	   to	   the	   infant-­‐like	   size	   and	   swell	   of	   Lake	   Leman,	   places	   it	   in	   the	   company	   of	   the	  
unnaturally	   large	  monster	  and	  the	  Alps	  that	  he	   leaps	  across	  with	  agility.	   	  Described	  as	  beating	  
and	  roaring,	  the	  ocean’s	  violence	  seems	  both	  typically	  oceanic	  and	  oddly	  simian.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  Arctic	  Ocean,	  Robert’s	  “country	  of	  eternal	   light”	  (5-­‐6)	   is	  also	  the	   landscape	   into	  which	  the	  
monster	  disappears,	  “borne	  away	  by	  the	  waves,	  and	  lost	  in	  darkness	  and	  distance”	  (191).	  	  These	  
contrasting	   views	   of	   the	   same	   landscape,	   and	   the	   seeming	   duality	   of	   representations	   of	  
environment	   in	   general,	   as	   transcendent/sublime	   or	   unnatural/monstrous,	   reflect	   to	   some	  
extent	   Shelley’s	   experience	   of	   the	   actual	   environmental	   conditions	   of	   the	   novel’s	   production.	  	  
Both	  Frankenstein	  and	  History	  of	  a	  Six	  Weeks’	  Tour	  were	  composed,	  in	  greater	  part,	  during	  the	  
coldest,	   wettest	   summer	   Europe	   had	   had	   in	   a	   hundred	   years	   –	   the	   summer	   of	   1816.	   	   The	  
weather,	   in	   fact,	  was	  so	  unusual	   that	  across	  Europe	  people	  claimed	  that	   the	  end	  of	   the	  world	  
was	  at	  hand.9	   	  As	   John	  Clubbe	  writes	   in	  “The	  Tempest-­‐toss’d	  Summer	  of	  1816:	  Mary	  Shelley’s	  
Frankenstein”	   (and	   as	   other	   critics	   have	   noted	   with	   respect	   to	   Byron’s	   “Darkness”10),	   the	  
weather	  of	  1816,	  during	  which	  Lake	  Leman	  flooded,	  “may	  even	  be	  the	  single	  most	  determining	  
influence	  upon	  the	  novel’s	  creation”	  (27).	  	  Clubbe	  ties	  a	  moment	  in	  Frankenstein,	  quoted	  below,	  
to	  a	  real	  moment	  in	  Shelley’s	  experience:	  Victor	  sees	  the	  storm	  “from	  precisely	  the	  spot	  in	  which	  
on	  10	  June	  Mary	  Shelley	  had	  originally	  seen	  it	  surging	  across	  the	  waters	  and	  had	  described	  it	  in	  
much	  the	  same	  words”	  (34).	  	  	  
I	   quitted	  my	   seat,	   and	  walked	  on,	   although	   the	  darkness	   and	   storm	   increased	  
every	  minute,	  and	  the	  thunder	  burst	  with	  a	  terrific	  crash	  over	  my	  head.	   	  It	  was	  
echoed	  from	  Salêve,	  the	  Juras,	  and	  the	  Alps	  of	  Savoy;	  vivid	   flashes	  of	   lightning	  
dazzled	  my	  eyes,	  illuminating	  the	  lake,	  making	  it	  appear	  like	  a	  vast	  sheet	  of	  fire;	  
then	   for	   an	   instant	   every	   thing	   seemed	   of	   a	   pitchy	   darkness,	   until	   the	   eye	  
recovered	  itself	  from	  the	  preceding	  flash.	  …	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While	  I	  watched	  the	  storm,	  so	  beautiful	  yet	  terrific,	  I	  wandered	  on	  with	  a	  hasty	  
step.	   	   This	   noble	  war	   in	   the	   sky	   elevated	  my	   spirits;	   I	   clasped	  my	   hands,	   and	  
exclaimed	  aloud,	  “William,	  dear	  angel!	   this	   is	   thy	   funeral,	   this	   thy	  dirge!”	   	  As	   I	  
said	   these	  words	   I	   perceived	   in	   the	   gloom	  a	   figure	  which	   stole	   from	  behind	   a	  
clump	  of	  trees	  near	  me;	  I	  stood	  fixed,	  gazing	  intently:	  I	  could	  not	  be	  mistaken.	  	  A	  
flash	  of	  lightning	  illuminated	  the	  object,	  and	  discovered	  its	  shape	  plainly	  to	  me;	  
its	  gigantic	  stature,	  and	  the	  deformity	  of	  its	  aspect,	  more	  hideous	  than	  belongs	  
to	  humanity,	  instantly	  informed	  me	  that	  it	  was	  the	  wretch,	  the	  filthy	  daemon	  to	  
whom	  I	  had	  given	  life.	  	  …Nothing	  in	  human	  shape	  could	  have	  destroyed	  that	  fair	  
child.	  	  He	  was	  the	  murderer.	  (56)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Clubbe	  attributes	  the	  role	  of	  lightning	  in	  the	  novel,	  which	  appears	  as	  a	  creative	  and	  destructive	  
force	  at	  key	  moments	  in	  the	  text,	  to	  the	  incredible	  storms	  the	  Shelleys	  witnessed	  that	  summer.	  	  
His	  work	  suggests	  that	  it	  isn’t	  a	  coincidence	  that	  Frankenstein	  is	  a	  tale	  “of	  the	  human	  psyche	  in	  
agonized	  conflict	  with	  the	  supernatural”	  (26).	  
I	   will	   take	   this	   a	   step	   further.	   	   The	   weather,	   indeed	   the	   entire	   environmental	   conditions	   of	  
novel’s	   composition,	   also	   impacted	   Frankenstein	   negatively,	   as	   culture’s	   terror	   of	   nature’s	  
agency	  –	  of	  oceans	  and	  storms	  and	  jagged	  peaks	  –	  as	  the	  horror	  of	  the	  nonhuman	  in	  the	  figure	  
of	   the	  monster.	   	  The	  conflict	  with	  the	  supernatural	   is,	   in	   fact,	  a	  conflict	  with	  the	   idea	  of	  being	  
part	   of	   nature,	   with	   the	   fact	   of	   human	   animality.	   	   The	   passage	   above	   is	   significant	   not	   only	  
because	  it	  links	  Shelley’s	  lived	  experience	  of	  the	  nonhuman	  world	  to	  the	  text,	  but	  also	  because	  it	  
links	  the	  power	  and	  agency	  of	  nonhuman	  nature	  to	  the	  person	  of	  the	  monster	  (this	  is	  reflected	  
in	  form	  as	  well	  as	  content;	  just	  as	  the	  ocean	  seems	  somewhat	  simian	  in	  a	  later	  passage,	  here	  the	  
monster	   appears	   almost	   elemental).	   	   As	   these	   two	   are	   fused,	   so	   are	   Victor	   and	   the	  monster,	  
making	   Victor	   the	   murderer,	   rather	   than	   the	   keeper,	   of	   his	   brother.	   	   Victor’s	   moment	   of	  
“elevated”	   spirits,	   in	   which	   his	   solitary	   grief	   and	   rage	   seem	   passively	   reflected	   in	   the	  
environmental	  conditions	  around	  him,	  becomes	  one	  of	  horror	  and	  disgust	  with	  the	  appearance	  
of	   the	   monster.	   	   In	   this	   same	   scene,	   Victor	   refers	   to	   him	   as	   wretch,	   daemon,	   devil,	   being,	  
creature,	  and,	  significantly,	  “the	  animal”	  (57,	  emphasis	  mine).	  	  Though	  he	  considers	  the	  monster	  
“nearly	   in	   the	   light	  of	  my	  own	  vampire,	  my	  own	  spirit	   let	   loose	   from	  the	  grave,	  and	   forced	   to	  
destroy	  all	  that	  was	  dear	  to	  me,”	  Victor	  denies	  his	  own	  animality	  when	  he	  calls	  the	  monster	  “the	  
animal”	  (57).	  	  Again,	  “nothing	  in	  human	  shape”	  could	  have	  destroyed	  the	  “angel”	  William,	  only	  
something	   animal	   or	   elemental,	   “a	   blot	   upon	   the	   earth,”	   as	   the	   monster	   calls	   himself,	   “a	  
disfiguring	  spot	  or	  mark”	  (“Blot”).	   	  Uncannily,	  the	  monster	  is	  also	  both	  “a	  moral	  stain”	  and	  “an	  
obliteration	   by	   way	   of	   correction”	   (“Blot”);	   he	   embodies	   death	   and	   destruction	   both	   as	   an	  
example	  of	  and	  corrective	  to	  the	  arrogance	  of	  Western	  culture.	   	   In	  several	  senses,	  he	   is	  also	  a	  
reminder	   of	   culture’s	   status	   as	   product	   of	   the	  natural	  world.	   	   The	   supernatural	   language	   (the	  
“angel”	   William	   and	   “vampire”	   monster)	   and	   plot	   of	   the	   novel	   are	   displacements	   of	   (and	  
placeholders	  for)	  a	  far	  more	  earthly	  and	  earthy	  terror.	  
An	   ecocultural	   reading	   of	   Frankenstein	   suggests	   that	   the	   influences	   of	   nonhuman	   nature	  
permeate	  content	  and	   form.	   	  As	   several	   critics	  have	  noted,11	   the	   fantastic	   thunderstorms	   that	  
move	  throughout	  the	  text,	  and	  indeed	  all	  of	  the	  descriptions	  of	  the	  Alps	  in	  the	  novel,	  are	  drawn	  
from	  Shelley’s	  actual	   time	   in	   the	   region	   recorded	   in	  History	   and	   in	  her	   letters.	   	   In	  a	  variety	  of	  
ways,	   this	   experience	   is	   figured	   in	   the	   person	   of	   the	   monster.	   	   The	   connections	   between	  
nonhuman	  nature	   and	   the	   produced	  body	   of	   the	  monster	   surface	   in	   the	  monster	   himself	   –	   a	  
nonhuman	  creature	  and	  a	  product	  of	  human	  culture	  (and	  acculturation).	  	  As	  such,	  he	  expresses	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Western	  culture’s	  fear	  of	  its	  Other.	  	  Frankenstein	  registers	  this	  terror	  of	  nonhuman	  agency	  as,	  in	  
part,	   an	   anxiety	   of	   objectification.	   	   In	   second	   nature	   the	   oceanic	   feeling	   becomes	   the	   fear	   of	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Warren	  Montag,	  “The	  ‘Workshop	  of	  Filthy	  Creation:’	  A	  Marxist	  Reading	  of	  Frankenstein”	  (395).	  
2	  Paul	  O’Flinn,	  “Production	  and	  Reproduction:	  The	  Case	  of	  Frankenstein”	  (26).	  
3	  Elsie	  B.	  Michie’s	  “Frankenstein	  and	  Marx’s	  Theories	  of	  Alienated	  Labor”	  comes	  closest	  to	  this	  realization.	  
She	  argues	  that	  using	  Marx’s	  descriptions	  of	  alienation	  to	  read	  the	  novel	  closely	  reveals	  Victor	  as	  the	  
alienated	   worker	   and	   the	   creature	   as	   the	   externalization	   of	   his	   alienation	   (94-­‐95).	   	   From	   this	  
perspective,	  the	  materials	  used	  to	  make	  the	  creature	  signify	  production’s	  breakdown	  of	  the	  natural	  
world	  into	  the	  dead	  components	  of	  manufacture,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  worker’s	  alienation	  from	  the	  natural	  
world,	   his	   senses,	   and	   the	   materiality	   of	   production	   (the	   monster	   figures	   here	   also	   as	   a	  
representation	  of	  materiality,	  signified	  by	  his	  incredible	  size)	  (96).	  	  While	  Michie	  doesn’t	  spend	  much	  
time	   examining	   actual	   descriptions	   of	   nonhuman	  nature,	   she	   does	   acknowledge	   that	   nature	  might	  
serve	  a	  purpose	  in	  the	  text	  beyond	  a	  simple	  repression	  of	  the	  modern.	  
4	  A	  case	  in	  point,	  Freud	  analyzes	  this	  feeling	  as	  unnecessary,	  a	  residual	  persistence	  of	  an	  original	  psyche.	  
At	   the	  beginning	  of	  Civilization	  and	   its	  Discontents,	   Freud	  discusses	   the	   “oceanic	   feeling,”	   a	  phrase	  
derived	   from	   the	   term	  by	  which	  his	   friend	  describes	   the	   sensation	  of	   the	  world	   as	   limitlessness	   or	  
eternal,	  “unbounded	  –	  as	  it	  were,	  ‘oceanic’”	  (11).	  	  It	  is	  “a	  feeling	  of	  an	  indissoluble	  bond,	  of	  being	  one	  
with	   the	  external	  world	  as	  a	  whole”	   (12).	   	   This	  discussion	   serves	  as	  a	  bridge	  between	  Future	  of	  an	  
Illusion,	  on	  religious	  feeling,	  and	  Civilization,	  on	  the	  future	  of	  the	  human	  species.	  	  Freud	  comes	  to	  the	  
conclusion	   that	   the	   oceanic	   feeling	   does	   not	   present	   a	   strong	   enough	   claim	   to	   be	   the	   source	   of	  
religious	  feeling	  because,	  “a	  feeling	  can	  only	  be	  a	  source	  of	  energy	  [for	  another	  feeling]	   if	   it	   is	   itself	  
the	  expression	  of	  a	  strong	  need”	  (20).	  	  He	  assumes	  that	  the	  oceanic	  feeling	  is	  not	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  
primary	  need	  in	  part	  because	  he	  can	  find	  no	  trace	  of	  this	  feeling	  in	  himself.	  
5	   “Positively”	   and	   “negatively”	   inscribed	   responses	   to	   nonhuman	   nature	   (somewhat	   analogous	   to	  
photographic	  images	  recorded	  as	  negatives	  and	  developed	  as	  positives)	  coexist	  simultaneously.	  	  	  
6	  In	  the	  notes	  to	  the	  Discourse	  on	  Inequality,	  Rousseau	  writes,	  “Without	  ceremony	  our	  travelers	  take	  for	  
beasts,	  under	  the	  name	  pongos,	  mandrills,	  orangutans,	  the	  same	  beings	  that	  the	  ancients,	  under	  the	  
names	  satyrs,	  fauns,	  sylvans,	  took	  for	  divinities.	  	  Perhaps,	  after	  more	  precise	  research,	  it	  will	  be	  found	  
that	  they	  are	  neither	  animals	  nor	  gods,	  but	  men”	  (209).	  	  	  
7	  With	  this	  pattern	  in	  mind,	  the	  monster’s	  tale	  as	  the	  core	  narrative	  is	  the	  most	  intertextual,	  even	  to	  the	  
point	  of	  invoking	  another	  Bildungsroman	  as	  part	  of	  the	  monster’s	  acculturation,	  Goethe’s	  Sorrows	  of	  
Young	  Werther.	  	  	  
8	   Paul	  Cantor	   argues	   that	   Shelley	   condenses	   the	   thematic	   content	  of	  Milton’s	   epic	   into	   two	   characters,	  
thereby	   also	   doubling	   the	   Prometheus	   myth	   (103-­‐5).	   	   As	   he	   has	   it,	   the	   role	   of	   Satan	   is	   divided	  
between	  Victor	  and	   the	  monster,	  who	  also	   respectively	   represent	  God	  and	  Adam;	   in	   this	  way,	  God	  
and	  his	  creation	  are	  both	  promethean	  and	  satanic	  (105).	  
9	   Looking	  back	   from	  1979,	  Scientific	  American	   published	  an	  article	  on	   this	  mysterious	   summer,	  possibly	  
caused	  by	  bursts	  of	  sunspots,	  titled,	  “The	  Year	  Without	  a	  Summer.”	  
10	  For	  example,	  see	  Jonathan	  Bate’s	  “Living	  with	  the	  Weather.”	  	  
11	  Including	  Anne	  K.	  Mellor.	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